Certiorari Jurisdiction u/A 226 Can Quash Grossly Perverse Tribunal Findings
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873 | Civil Appeal Nos. 10693-10694 of 2026
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan & Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date of Judgment: August 31, 2026
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
The Supreme Court of India, in its landmark judgment dated August 31, 2026, delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, has reaffirmed and clarified the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, specifically concerning the writ of certiorari. The case of Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (Dead) Through Legal Representative v. M/s. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (Regd.) & Ors. (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873) stands as a seminal authority on the circumstances under which High Courts may interfere with orders passed by Tribunals and Arbitrators under their certiorari jurisdiction.
This judgment assumes extraordinary significance in the domain of administrative and constitutional law, as it draws a clear demarcation between permissible supervisory interference and impermissible appellate review. The Apex Court has categorically held that while the scope of interference under certiorari is inherently limited, a finding of fact recorded without any supporting evidence, or based purely on surmises and conjectures, constitutes an error of law amenable to correction by the High Court. This principle not only fortifies the supervisory role of High Courts but also ensures that tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies do not render perverse findings that escape judicial scrutiny.
The case originated from a protracted dispute concerning membership and plot allotment in a cooperative housing society in Delhi, spanning several decades and multiple rounds of litigation. The Supreme Court's intervention was necessitated by the appellant's challenge to the Delhi High Court's order, which had set aside concurrent orders of the Arbitrator and the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The judgment is a masterclass in balancing judicial restraint with the imperative of correcting manifest injustice.
2. Factual Matrix of the Dispute
The factual backdrop of this case is both intricate and historically layered, dating back to the early 1950s. The dispute revolved around the claim of one Mr. S.N. Sharma (the original claimant), who asserted that he was a member of M/s. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (the Respondent Society) and was consequently entitled to the allotment of a residential plot. The Society, however, maintained that the original claimant had voluntarily resigned from his membership in 1951 and was never readmitted thereafter, despite a subsequent application made in 1952.
The documentary record before the authorities revealed several critical pieces of evidence that would eventually form the basis of the Supreme Court's conclusions. The Society's records contained the resignation of the original claimant and its acceptance, duly recorded in the Minutes of the Managing Committee Meeting held on May 5, 1951. Following this resignation, the share of the original claimant was transferred to another member on August 18, 1951. Furthermore, the Minutes of the Managing Committee Meeting dated November 5, 1952, explicitly recorded the rejection of the original claimant's application for membership. To compound matters against the claimant, the Society's records also showed that as late as November 4, 1979, the original claimant's request to pay a deposit for a plot of land was rejected by the Society.
Despite this formidable array of documentary evidence, the Arbitrator (the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Delhi) proceeded to pass an award on October 7, 2003, upholding the claim of the original claimant. The Arbitrator's reasoning was remarkably brief and rested on a presumption that the original claimant had continued to be a member of the Society during his lifetime, primarily because his name allegedly appeared in the list of members. The Arbitrator dismissed the Society's plea regarding resignation and subsequent re-entry as "not tenable" without engaging with the documentary evidence on record.
The Delhi Co-operative Tribunal, in its equally cryptic order dated March 18, 2004, affirmed the Arbitrator's award in a six-paragraph order. The Tribunal noted that while the original claimant had resigned in 1951, the Managing Committee had decided to admit him as a member as a "special case" for clearing suspense items. The Tribunal also referred to the fact that the claimant's name figured in lists provided to the Civil Court in 1965 and the High Court in 1972, and on this slender basis, refused to interfere with the Arbitrator's order.
3. Procedural History: A Chequered Litigation Journey
The present proceedings before the Supreme Court have what the Court itself described as a "chequered history." It is essential to trace this procedural trajectory to appreciate the true significance of the final judgment. The dispute first reached the Supreme Court in an earlier round of litigation in Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. (2002 INSC 345), where the Apex Court set aside an ex-parte award passed by the original Arbitrator and directed the continuation of arbitration proceedings from the stage at which the Society was set ex-parte.
Following this remand, the original Arbitrator having expired, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Delhi, was appointed as the new Arbitrator. After concluding the arbitration proceedings, this new Arbitrator passed the award on October 7, 2003, which is the subject matter of the present appeals. The Society challenged this award by preferring an appeal under Section 76 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972. The Delhi Co-operative Tribunal dismissed this appeal on March 18, 2004, upholding the Arbitrator's findings.
Aggrieved by this concurrent affirmation, the Society filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court. The High Court, by its judgment dated October 6, 2010, found that neither the Arbitrator nor the Tribunal had considered the relevant material on record. It held that the claim of membership made in 1952 was without basis, as no resolution granting membership was ever passed, and no share certificate was issued. The High Court also took into account equitable considerations, noting that there were four prior claimants seeking allotment of a plot, and bypassing their claims would be inequitable. Consequently, the High Court set aside both the Arbitrator's award and the Tribunal's order.
It was this judgment of the Delhi High Court that was challenged before the Supreme Court by the legal heir of the original claimant, leading to the present ruling. The appellant contended that the High Court had exceeded its writ jurisdiction by interfering with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Arbitrator and the Tribunal.
4. Core Issues Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was called upon to adjudicate upon the following fundamental questions of law and fact:
| S.No. | Issue | Nature |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Whether the High Court, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226, was justified in interfering with the concurrent orders of the Arbitrator and the Tribunal? | Substantive (Scope of Writ Jurisdiction) |
| 2 | Whether a finding of fact recorded without any supporting evidence or based purely on surmises and conjectures amounts to an error of law? | Legal (Jurisprudential) |
| 3 | Whether the High Court could take into account equitable considerations, including the existence of prior claimants, while exercising certiorari jurisdiction? | Substantive (Equity in Writ Jurisdiction) |
| 4 | Whether the documentary evidence on record established that the original claimant was never admitted as a member of the Society? | Factual (Evidentiary) |
5. Arguments Advanced by the Parties
5.1 Appellant's Submissions
Mr. Jitendra Mohan Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, vehemently contended that the High Court had transgressed the limited contours of certiorari jurisdiction. He argued that the Arbitrator had duly considered all relevant aspects, including the fact that the original claimant was a member of the Society and had performed all his duties and obligations towards the Society for being allotted a plot. He emphasized that the original claimant's name was always shown in the list of members, and he continued to be a member until his death.
The appellant placed reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010 INSC 422) to argue that the High Court could not have interfered with the orders passed by the Arbitrator and the Tribunal. He also referred to various affidavits to substantiate his contention that vacant plots were available for allotment, and that the trial court's judgment dated March 31, 1965 (affirmed by the High Court on July 21, 1972) supported the availability of land. The core of the appellant's argument was that the High Court had effectively sat in appeal over the findings of the subordinate authorities, which is impermissible under Article 226.
5.2 Respondent's Submissions
Mr. Ashim Vachher, learned Senior Advocate for the Society, supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that both the Arbitrator and the Tribunal had failed to examine the relevant documents on record, which clearly established that the original claimant's membership had ceased in 1951 and was never revived. He pointed out that the fresh membership sought in 1952 was categorically rejected, and no share certificate was ever issued thereafter.
The respondent argued that the assumption that payment of ₹15,000/- in 1952 would entitle the claimant to allotment was incorrect, especially when there were other members with prior claims. He placed reliance on several precedents, including Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders (1975 INSC 75), Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (2002 INSC 445), and Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey (1987 INSC 248), to urge that the High Court was fully justified in interfering when the subordinate authorities had ignored crucial documentary evidence. He contended that the High Court's intervention was not an exercise in appellate jurisdiction but a necessary corrective to a perverse and legally unsustainable finding.
6. Legal Framework: The Scope of Certiorari Under Article 226
To fully comprehend the ratio of this judgment, one must first understand the nature and scope of the writ of certiorari as enshrined in Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ of certiorari is one of the five prerogative writs available under Article 226, alongside Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, and Quo Warranto. It is a supervisory remedy, not an appellate one, and its primary purpose is to ensure that inferior courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial authorities do not exceed their jurisdiction or commit errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings.
— Supreme Court in CCRAS v. Bikartan Das (2023 INSC 733)The Supreme Court, in its landmark Constitution Bench decision in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (1964), laid down the foundational principles governing certiorari jurisdiction. The Court held that certiorari is not meant to substitute the High Court's judgment for that of the inferior tribunal, but only to correct jurisdictional errors and patent illegality. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal over findings of fact, and it cannot review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the subordinate court is based.
However, this principle of non-interference with factual findings is not absolute. The Supreme Court has consistently held that there are exceptions to this general rule. A finding of fact based on no evidence, or one that is perverse, or based purely on surmises and conjectures, can be challenged by way of certiorari, as such findings amount to an error of law. This distinction is crucial: the High Court cannot substitute its own view of the evidence, but it can quash a finding that has no evidentiary foundation whatsoever.
In Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das (2023 INSC 733), the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the scope of certiorari and held that a writ of certiorari is a high prerogative writ that should not be issued as a matter of course. It is meant to correct patent errors, not wrong decisions. The Court emphasized that certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory, and by its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected, not a mere wrong decision. This jurisprudential framework formed the bedrock of the Court's analysis in the present case.
| Ground | Permissible Under Certiorari? | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Jurisdictional Error (Absence, Excess, or Failure) | Yes | When the tribunal acts without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or fails to exercise jurisdiction where it is mandated to do so. |
| Error of Law Apparent on the Face of Record | Yes | When the error is so manifest that it does not require detailed examination or reappreciation of evidence. |
| Findings Based on No Evidence | Yes | A finding recorded without any supporting material or documentary evidence amounts to a perverse finding and an error of law. |
| Reappreciation of Evidence | No | The High Court cannot sit in appeal and substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the tribunal. |
| Re-weighing of Evidence | No | The High Court cannot reassess the probative value of evidence or arrive at a different factual conclusion. |
| Violation of Principles of Natural Justice | Yes | When the tribunal fails to follow the audi alteram partem rule or acts with bias. |
7. The Supreme Court Judgment: A Detailed Examination
After hearing the learned Senior Advocates for both parties and perusing the extensive documentary record, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous judgment authored by Justice Atul S. Chandurkar. The Court dismissed the civil appeals with no orders as to costs, thereby upholding the Delhi High Court's judgment in its entirety.
7.1 The Court's Reasoning on Certiorari Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating the settled principles governing the exercise of extraordinary and certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court emphasized that while the scope for interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction is limited, an error of law evident from the record is open to correction by the High Court. The Court then proceeded to examine whether the findings of the Arbitrator and the Tribunal fell within this exception.
The Court found that the Arbitrator, in his order dated October 7, 2003, had proceeded on a bare presumption that the original claimant continued to be a member of the Society. The Arbitrator's exact words were: "It has to be presumed that he continued to be a member of the society till the end of his life and his name continued to be shown in the list of members." The Tribunal, in its equally cryptic six-paragraph order, affirmed this presumption without independently examining the documentary evidence.
The Supreme Court held that this approach was fundamentally flawed. The Arbitrator and the Tribunal had glossed over relevant documentary material that was squarely on record. These documents included:
- The resignation of the original claimant and its acceptance, recorded in the Minutes of the Managing Committee Meeting held on May 5, 1951;
- The transfer of the original claimant's share to another member on August 18, 1951;
- The rejection of the original claimant's application for membership as per the Minutes of the Managing Committee Meeting dated November 5, 1952;
- The rejection of the original claimant's request to permit him to pay the deposit for a plot of land as late as on November 4, 1979.
The Court concluded that if these documents had been properly considered, they would have led to only one conclusion: the original claimant was not a member of the Society. The finding to the contrary was not merely wrong; it was perverse because it was based on no evidence and ignored conclusive documentary proof.
If a finding is recorded without there being any evidence on record or a finding is recorded without any supporting document, whatsoever, a case for interference would be made out since such finding would amount to an error of law.
— Supreme Court in Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873)7.2 The "No Evidence" Doctrine as Error of Law
One of the most significant contributions of this judgment is its reaffirmation of the "no evidence" doctrine. The Supreme Court explicitly held that a finding of fact based on no evidence, or purely on surmises and conjectures, could be regarded as an error of law. This principle, originally articulated in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das (2023 INSC 733), was applied with precision in the present case.
The Court quoted paragraphs 63 and 64 from the CCRAS judgment, which state:
By applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court has sent a clear message: tribunals and arbitrators cannot render findings that fly in the face of uncontroverted documentary evidence and expect such findings to be immune from judicial review. The High Court's role as a constitutional sentinel requires it to step in when subordinate authorities have patently failed to discharge their adjudicatory function.
7.3 Equitable Considerations in Certiorari Jurisdiction
Another noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the Supreme Court's approval of the High Court's reliance on equitable considerations while exercising certiorari jurisdiction. The High Court had noted that there were four prior claimants seeking allotment of a plot, and that bypassing their claims to accommodate the original claimant would be inequitable. The Supreme Court endorsed this approach, stating:
This observation is significant because it clarifies that certiorari jurisdiction, while primarily legal and supervisory, is not devoid of equity. When the record clearly demonstrates that granting relief to one party would result in manifest injustice to others, the High Court is not powerless to take such considerations into account. This aligns with the broader constitutional philosophy of ensuring justice, fairness, and reasonableness in all state actions.
7.4 The Final Disposition
The Supreme Court, having found that the original claimant was never admitted as a member of the Society, held that the question of allotment of a plot did not arise at all. The Court explicitly stated that it was not necessary to go into the issue of actual availability of land, as the foundational requirement of membership itself was not satisfied. The civil appeals were dismissed with no orders as to costs, and pending interlocutory applications were disposed of accordingly.
8. Critical Analysis of the Judgment
8.1 Strengthening Judicial Review
This judgment is a robust affirmation of the High Courts' supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227. In an era where tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies are increasingly burdened with adjudicatory functions, the need for effective judicial oversight has never been greater. The Supreme Court has struck a delicate balance: it has reiterated that High Courts cannot act as appellate forums, but it has also clarified that they cannot remain passive spectators when subordinate authorities render findings that are grossly perverse or devoid of evidentiary support.
8.2 The Distinction Between "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence"
A crucial jurisprudential distinction that emerges from this judgment is between a finding based on "no evidence" and one based on "insufficient evidence." The High Court cannot interfere merely because it believes the evidence was insufficient to support the tribunal's conclusion. That would amount to appellate review. However, when there is literally no evidence to support a finding, or when the finding is contradicted by conclusive documentary proof that the tribunal has chosen to ignore, the finding crosses the threshold from being merely wrong to being legally perverse. This distinction preserves the autonomy of tribunals while ensuring that their decisions remain within the bounds of reason and law.
8.3 The Quality of Reasoning in Tribunals
The Supreme Court's repeated characterization of the Arbitrator's and Tribunal's orders as "cryptic" and "almost bereft of reasoning" serves as an important reminder to all quasi-judicial authorities. The duty to give reasons is not merely a procedural formality; it is a cornerstone of the rule of law. When authorities fail to engage with relevant evidence and instead rest their decisions on bare presumptions, they render themselves vulnerable to judicial review. This aspect of the judgment should prompt tribunals across the country to improve the quality and rigor of their reasoning.
8.4 The Role of Documentary Evidence
The judgment underscores the paramount importance of documentary evidence in adjudicatory proceedings. In the present case, the Society's records—minutes of meetings, transfer deeds, rejection letters—formed an unbroken chain of evidence that conclusively established the non-membership of the original claimant. The Arbitrator's failure to engage with these documents was not a minor oversight; it was a fundamental error that tainted the entire adjudication. This reinforces the principle that documentary evidence, when authentic and uncontroverted, must be given due weight by all adjudicatory bodies.
9. Comparative Jurisprudence: The Basamma Contrast
It is instructive to compare the present judgment with another significant ruling delivered by the Supreme Court just weeks earlier—Basamma & Anr. v. Goparappa & Ors. (2026 INSC 712), decided on July 16, 2026, by a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi. In that case, the Supreme Court set aside a Karnataka High Court order that had interfered with the findings of the First Appellate Court under Article 226.
The Basamma case is often cited alongside the present judgment because together, they illustrate the fine line that High Courts must walk when exercising certiorari jurisdiction. In Basamma, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had transgressed the limited contours of certiorari jurisdiction by setting aside findings recorded by the First Appellate Court after independently examining the evidence. The Court found that the First Appellate Court had, in fact, considered the pleadings, mutation entries, sale deeds, and conduct of the parties before recording its findings. Therefore, the High Court's interference was impermissible.
| Aspect | Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (2026) | Basamma v. Goparappa (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Finding | Finding based on no evidence; documentary proof ignored | Finding based on evidence duly considered by appellate court |
| High Court's Approach | Correctly identified perversity and patent error of law | Reappreciated evidence and substituted its own factual conclusions |
| Supreme Court's Verdict | Upheld High Court's interference | Set aside High Court's interference |
| Key Principle | "No evidence" = Error of law; interference justified | Re-weighing evidence = Appellate jurisdiction; interference not justified |
| Natural Justice | Not a primary issue; both parties were heard | High Court decided ex parte without notice to affected parties |
The juxtaposition of these two judgments provides invaluable guidance to practitioners and courts. It demonstrates that the permissibility of interference under Article 226 depends not on the outcome of the tribunal's decision, but on the process by which it was reached. When the process is fundamentally flawed—when findings are based on no evidence, when crucial documents are ignored, when reasoning is absent—interference is not only permissible but necessary. When the process is sound, even if the High Court might have reached a different conclusion, interference is prohibited.
10. Practical Implications for Litigants and Lawyers
10.1 Drafting Writ Petitions
For practitioners drafting writ petitions under Article 226, this judgment provides a clear template for framing grounds of challenge. Instead of broadly alleging that the tribunal's findings are "wrong" or "erroneous," the petition must specifically demonstrate that the finding is perverse, based on no evidence, or contradicted by conclusive documentary proof on record. The petition should meticulously identify the documents that were ignored and explain how their consideration would have led to a different conclusion.
10.2 Defending Tribunal Orders
Conversely, for those defending tribunal orders against writ challenges, the judgment suggests that the strongest defense lies in demonstrating that the tribunal engaged with all relevant evidence, even if its ultimate conclusion is debatable. If the tribunal's order shows a reasoned consideration of the documentary record, the High Court will be constrained from interfering, no matter how strongly the petitioner disagrees with the outcome.
10.3 Cooperative Society Disputes
The judgment has specific relevance to disputes involving cooperative societies, which are governed by special statutes like the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972. Members and societies alike must maintain meticulous records of meetings, resolutions, membership applications, and transfers. The absence of proper documentation—or the existence of clear documentary proof—can be decisive in both arbitration and subsequent judicial review proceedings. For more on your constitutional rights in administrative disputes, see our guide on 25 Legal Rights Every Indian Must Know.
10.4 Equitable Considerations
The Supreme Court's endorsement of equitable considerations opens another avenue for litigants. Where the record shows that granting relief to the petitioner would result in manifest injustice to third parties (such as prior claimants), this can be urged as an independent ground supporting the High Court's interference. However, such arguments must be grounded in the specific facts of the case and supported by documentary evidence.
| Stakeholder | Key Actionable Insight |
|---|---|
| Writ Petitioners | Frame grounds specifically around "no evidence" or "perversity"; identify ignored documents; avoid arguments that sound like appellate review. |
| Respondents (Defending Tribunal Orders) | Demonstrate that the tribunal engaged with all evidence; highlight reasoned findings; argue that disagreement does not equal jurisdictional error. |
| Cooperative Societies | Maintain impeccable records of all meetings, resolutions, and membership decisions; ensure minutes are properly authenticated and preserved. |
| Arbitrators & Tribunals | Provide detailed, reasoned orders that engage with all relevant documentary evidence; avoid cryptic or presumption-based reasoning. |
| High Courts | Exercise restraint but do not hesitate to quash findings that are demonstrably perverse or based on no evidence; respect the "no evidence" exception. |
11. Conclusion
The Last Word
The Supreme Court's judgment in Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (Dead) Through LR v. M/s. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (Regd.) & Ors. is a masterful exposition of the scope of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It reaffirms that the High Court's supervisory power, while limited and non-appellate, is not a nullity. When subordinate authorities render findings that are grossly perverse, based on no evidence, or contradicted by conclusive documentary proof, the High Court has not only the power but the duty to intervene.
The judgment is particularly significant for its clarification of the "no evidence" doctrine as an exception to the general rule of non-interference with factual findings. By holding that a finding based purely on surmises and conjectures amounts to an error of law, the Supreme Court has provided a powerful tool for litigants seeking to challenge arbitrary and unreasoned tribunal orders. At the same time, by upholding the High Court's consideration of equitable factors, the judgment ensures that justice is not reduced to a mechanical exercise but remains sensitive to the broader context of each dispute.
For the legal community, this case serves as a reminder that the quality of reasoning in tribunal orders is not a luxury but a necessity. For citizens, it reaffirms that constitutional remedies under Articles 226 and 227 remain vital safeguards against administrative arbitrariness. And for the judiciary, it is a reaffirmation of the delicate but essential role that High Courts play in maintaining the integrity of India's administrative justice system.
As the Supreme Court wisely observed, "though the scope for interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction would be limited, an error of law evident from the record is open to correction by the High Court." In upholding this principle, the Court has once again demonstrated that justice, when grounded in evidence and reason, is never beyond the reach of those who seek it.
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