In a case that has caught the attention of legal experts, corporate professionals, and social sector workers alike, the apex court ruled that an auth
S. 138 NI Act | Authorised Signatory Who Signed Cheque On NGO's Behalf Deemed As 'Drawer', Liable For Dishonour: Supreme Court
Introduction: A Landmark Ruling That Changes Everything for NGO Signatories
The Supreme Court of India has delivered a judgment that sends a clear and powerful message to anyone who signs cheques on behalf of an organization, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In a case that has caught the attention of legal experts, corporate professionals, and social sector workers alike, the apex court ruled that an authorised signatory who signs a cheque on an NGO's behalf can be deemed the "drawer" of that cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). This means such a signatory can be held personally liable if the cheque bounces.
This is not just another routine judgment. It fundamentally alters how we understand liability under India's cheque bounce laws. For years, many people serving as treasurers, secretaries, or authorised signatories in NGOs, trusts, and societies believed they were merely acting as agents of the organization. They assumed that if a cheque issued by them on behalf of their NGO was dishonoured, the organization would bear the liability, not them personally. The Supreme Court has now shattered that misconception, at least in cases where the signatory has been explicitly entrusted with financial responsibilities.
The case of K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana & Ors. (2026) is the one that brought this critical issue to the forefront. The appellant, Mr. K. Ranganayakulu, was the Treasurer of an NGO named TIMES. He had signed cheques on behalf of this organization under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a power distribution company. When those cheques were dishonoured, he found himself facing criminal prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act. He argued that he was merely an authorised signatory and therefore could not be treated as the "drawer" of the cheque. The Supreme Court disagreed, and in doing so, has set a precedent that will resonate across India's vast NGO sector and beyond.
Let us walk through this judgment in simple, human terms. We will explore what happened, why the court ruled the way it did, what this means for you if you sign cheques for any organization, and how this fits into the larger picture of cheque bounce law in India. No complex legal jargon. No confusing tables. Just a straightforward conversation about a judgment that matters.
The Story Behind the Case: How a Treasurer Found Himself in Legal Trouble
To truly understand the weight of this judgment, we need to start with the facts. This is not an abstract legal debate. It is about a real person who found himself in a nightmare situation simply because he signed a few cheques for the NGO he served.
Mr. K. Ranganayakulu was the Treasurer of an NGO called TIMES. Like many NGOs in India, TIMES entered into an agreement with a government entity to provide certain services or execute a project. In this case, the agreement was with APCPDCL, which is now known as the Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana Limited (TSSPDCL). This was a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), a document that laid out the terms of the working relationship between the NGO and the power company.
Under this MoU, Mr. Ranganayakulu was not just any office bearer. He was specifically designated as the authorised signatory. This meant he had the official power to sign cheques, issue negotiable instruments, and make payments to APCPDCL on behalf of TIMES. The MoU made it clear that he was the financial point person for this arrangement. In fact, the MoU did not cast any financial liability or responsibility on any other office bearer of the NGO. It was Mr. Ranganayakulu alone who was entrusted with this critical role.
Things went wrong when the cheques issued by him were dishonoured by the bank. The reasons for the bounce could be many. Perhaps the NGO's account did not have sufficient funds. Perhaps there was some administrative mix-up. Perhaps the account was frozen or there were signature issues. Whatever the reason, the bank returned the cheques unpaid. In the eyes of the law, this is a serious matter. The NI Act treats cheque dishonour as a criminal offence under certain conditions, not merely a civil dispute.
The payee of the cheques, the power distribution company, did what the law allows them to do. They sent a legal demand notice to the drawer, demanding payment within fifteen days. When the payment was not made, they filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The complaint named Mr. Ranganayakulu as the accused. He was not just named as a representative of the NGO. He was prosecuted as the person responsible for the dishonour.
The trial court convicted him. This must have come as a devastating blow. Here was a man who probably thought he was doing his duty as a Treasurer, serving his organization, and now he was facing criminal conviction for a cheque bounce. He appealed, and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court of India, where a bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria took up the matter for detailed consideration.
The Core Legal Question: Who Is the "Drawer" Under Section 138?
The central question before the Supreme Court was deceptively simple but legally profound. Who is the "drawer" of a cheque when it is signed by an authorised signatory on behalf of an organization? Is the drawer the organization itself, the legal entity that owns the bank account? Or is the drawer the individual who physically puts pen to paper and signs the cheque? Or can both be considered drawers in different contexts?
Under Section 138 of the NI Act, the offence of cheque dishonour is committed by the "drawer" of the cheque. The section says that if a cheque drawn by a person on his account with a banker is returned unpaid due to insufficient funds or because it exceeds the arranged overdraft limit, and if certain conditions are met, then the drawer commits an offence punishable with imprisonment up to two years, or a fine up to twice the cheque amount, or both.
The term "drawer" is not explicitly defined in the NI Act in a way that clarifies this situation. In ordinary commercial transactions, when an individual writes a cheque from their personal account, they are clearly the drawer. When a company issues a cheque, the company is the drawer, but the cheque is signed by a director or an authorised signatory. Section 141 of the NI Act deals with offences by companies and provides for vicarious liability, meaning certain officers of the company can also be held liable along with the company.
Mr. Ranganayakulu's primary argument was that he was merely an authorised signatory. He was not the drawer. The drawer was TIMES, the NGO. He relied on a previous Supreme Court judgment in Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors. (2024), where the court had held that an authorised signatory is not the "drawer" under Section 138 for the purpose of Section 143A, which deals with interim compensation. He argued that if he was not the drawer, he could not be prosecuted under Section 138 as the principal accused.
The respondent, the power distribution company, argued otherwise. They pointed to the MoU, which specifically made Mr. Ranganayakulu the authorised signatory. They highlighted that no other office bearer of the NGO was made liable under the MoU. He was the "front face" of the NGO in all financial dealings with them. The responsibility to sign cheques, issue negotiable instruments, and make payments was squarely on his shoulders. Therefore, they contended, he was not merely a mechanical signatory. He was the person who, in effect, was drawing the cheque on behalf of the organization, and he should be treated as the drawer for the purpose of liability.
The Supreme Court's Analysis: Reading the Law in Context
The Supreme Court bench did not approach this case with a rigid, textbook definition of "drawer." Instead, they looked at the realities of the transaction, the specific role assigned to the appellant, and the purpose of the NI Act. Their analysis is a masterclass in contextual interpretation.
The court first examined the relationship between TIMES and Mr. Ranganayakulu. He was not a passive signatory who merely happened to sign a cheque because he was in the office that day. He was the Treasurer. Under the MoU, he was explicitly authorised to sign all negotiable instruments and to make payments to APCPDCL through cheque or RTGS online transactions. This was not a one-off signing. This was a structured, ongoing financial responsibility.
The court then looked at the MoU itself. The document made a clear and deliberate choice. It cast no liability on any other office bearer of the NGO. The entire financial responsibility under the agreement was channelled through Mr. Ranganayakulu. The court observed that the NGO had effectively made him its "front face" for all financial dealings with the respondent company.
This is a crucial observation. The court was essentially saying that when an organization deliberately puts one person forward as its financial representative, authorizes that person to sign cheques, and makes that person solely responsible for payments, the law will treat that person as the drawer. The organization cannot then hide behind corporate veils or organizational structures to shield that person from liability. The person who is the face of the transaction must also bear the consequences of that transaction.
The court distinguished the Shri Gurudatta Sugars case that Mr. Ranganayakulu had relied upon. In that case, the issue was specifically about Section 143A, which allows a court to direct the drawer to pay interim compensation. The Supreme Court clarified that the ruling in that case did not lay down a blanket immunity for all authorised signatories from being treated as drawers under Section 138. The court noted that authorised signatories can indeed be categorized as drawers when the conditions under Section 141 of the NI Act are met. The earlier judgment was context-specific and did not create a universal rule that no authorised signatory can ever be a drawer.
The court's reasoning was grounded in practical reality. If an authorised signatory is given complete control over an organization's financial dealings with a specific party, and if that signatory is the only person responsible for issuing and signing cheques under a formal agreement, then treating that person as merely an agent with no liability would create a dangerous loophole. Organizations could simply appoint a nominal signatory, bounce cheques at will, and then claim that the signatory was not the real drawer. This would defeat the very purpose of the NI Act, which is to ensure the credibility of negotiable instruments and to provide a strong deterrent against cheque dishonour.
The Key Holding: The "Front Face" Doctrine
The Supreme Court's final holding can be summarized in what we might call the "front face" doctrine, though the court did not use this exact label. The court stated:
"If the NGO i.e. TIMES has made the appellant as its front face by authorizing him to sign all the negotiable instruments and to make payment of the account to APCPDCL (Presently Telangana CPDCL) through cheque/RTGS online transaction, it is only the appellant who shall be responsible for all the consequences thereof."
This statement is powerful in its simplicity and clarity. It establishes a direct link between authorization and liability. If you are made the front face, you are responsible for the consequences. This is not vicarious liability, where you are held liable for someone else's actions because of your position. This is direct liability, where you are held liable because the law recognizes you as the drawer of the instrument.
The court upheld the conviction of Mr. Ranganayakulu. He was found guilty under Section 138 of the NI Act. However, the court did show some mercy when it came to the sentence. Taking into account that he was merely the Treasurer of the society and not a principal office bearer like a President or Chairman, the court modified the sentence. Instead of sending him to prison immediately, the court directed him to pay a fine of ₹1.5 crore to TSSPDCL within two months. If he failed to pay this fine, he would have to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
This modification of sentence is significant. It shows that while the Supreme Court was firm on the question of liability, it was not unmindful of the appellant's relative position within the organization. He was not the owner or the founder of the NGO. He was a Treasurer, an office bearer who may have been acting in good faith but found himself in a difficult situation because of the organization's financial troubles. The court balanced the need for deterrence with a measure of compassion, allowing him to avoid imprisonment if he could pay the substantial fine.
Why This Judgment Matters: The Broader Implications
This judgment is not just about one man and one NGO. It has far-reaching implications for India's vast social sector, corporate world, and anyone who serves as a signatory for an organization. Let us break down why this ruling is so important.
For the NGO Sector
India has millions of NGOs, trusts, societies, and voluntary organizations. These entities work on everything from education and health to environmental protection and human rights. Most of them are run by well-meaning individuals who dedicate their time and energy to social causes. Many of these individuals serve as office bearers, treasurers, secretaries, or presidents, and they routinely sign cheques on behalf of their organizations.
This judgment is a wake-up call for every such individual. If you are the authorised signatory for your NGO, and if your NGO enters into an agreement where you are specifically made responsible for financial transactions, you could be held personally liable as the drawer if a cheque bounces. Your good intentions, your social service, and your lack of personal benefit from the transaction may not protect you from prosecution under Section 138.
The judgment does not mean that every signatory in every NGO will automatically be liable. The key factors are the specific authorization, the exclusive responsibility, and the role as the "front face" of the organization in a particular transaction. But it does mean that signatories can no longer assume they are immune. They need to be extremely careful about the financial health of their organization, the state of its bank accounts, and the commitments they are making when they sign cheques.
For Corporate Signatories and Directors
While this case involved an NGO, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court are equally relevant for companies, firms, and other corporate entities. Directors and authorised signatories of companies often sign cheques on behalf of the company. Section 141 of the NI Act already provides for the liability of company officers in certain circumstances. This judgment reinforces the idea that the protective shield of corporate structure is not absolute.
If a director or signatory is the exclusive financial representative in a transaction, and if they are made the "front face" of the company for that deal, they could be treated as the drawer directly under Section 138, not just as a vicariously liable party under Section 141. This adds another layer of risk for corporate executives and emphasizes the need for robust financial governance within companies.
For Creditors and Payees
From the perspective of those who receive cheques, this judgment is a welcome development. One of the biggest challenges in cheque bounce cases is actually recovering the money. If you can only prosecute the company or the NGO, and if that entity has no assets or has shut down, you may be left with a worthless judgment. Being able to hold the individual signatory liable as the drawer gives creditors a much better chance of recovery.
This judgment empowers payees to demand that the authorised signatory be held accountable, especially in cases where the signatory has been explicitly made responsible for the transaction. It strengthens the credibility of cheques as a payment instrument because it ensures that the person who signs the cheque cannot easily evade responsibility.
For the Legal System
Legally, this judgment clarifies an area that was somewhat murky. The interplay between Section 138 and Section 141 of the NI Act has been the subject of much litigation. Courts have previously held that for company directors to be liable under Section 141, there must be specific averments in the complaint showing that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time. This judgment adds a new dimension by saying that in certain cases, the signatory can be treated as the drawer directly under Section 138, even without necessarily invoking Section 141.
This distinction matters. If a person is treated as the drawer under Section 138, they are the principal accused. If they are liable under Section 141, they are being held vicariously for the company's offence. The legal procedures, the burden of proof, and the nature of liability are different in these two scenarios. By recognizing that an authorised signatory can be the drawer, the Supreme Court has provided a more direct and efficient route for holding the real culprit accountable.
Understanding Section 138 of the NI Act: The Law That Bites
To fully appreciate this judgment, we need to understand what Section 138 of the NI Act actually says and why it is such a powerful provision. This section is the backbone of cheque bounce law in India, and it is one of the few instances where a purely commercial dispute can lead to criminal consequences.
Section 138 creates a statutory offence for the dishonour of cheques. It applies when a cheque drawn by a person on their account with a banker is returned unpaid by the bank either because of insufficient funds to honour the cheque or because the amount exceeds the arranged overdraft limit. The section does not apply to every bounced cheque automatically. There are three mandatory conditions that must be satisfied, and these are laid down in the proviso to the section.
- The cheque must be presented to the bank within six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
- The payee or the holder in due course must issue a written demand notice to the drawer within thirty days of receiving information from the bank about the cheque being returned unpaid.
- The drawer must fail to make payment of the cheque amount within fifteen days of receiving the demand notice.
Only if all three conditions are met does the offence under Section 138 come into existence. The punishment is imprisonment for a term that may extend to two years, or a fine that may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or both. The offence is compoundable, meaning the parties can settle it, and it is also bailable, but the threat of criminal prosecution is real and serious.
The Explanation to Section 138 clarifies that the debt or liability for which the cheque is issued must be legally enforceable. This means you cannot use Section 138 for illegal transactions or purely personal disputes that do not create a legal debt.
In the context of the Ranganayakulu case, all these conditions were presumably met. The cheques were presented, they were dishonoured, a demand notice was sent, and the payment was not made within fifteen days. The only question was whether Mr. Ranganayakulu was the "drawer" who could be prosecuted. The Supreme Court answered this in the affirmative.
Section 141: The Companion Provision for Companies and Organizations
While Section 138 deals with the drawer, Section 141 of the NI Act deals with offences by companies, firms, and other bodies corporate. This section is crucial because it provides for vicarious liability, meaning that certain individuals associated with the company can be held liable for the offence committed by the company.
Section 141 states that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, then every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, as well as the company itself, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. There is also a provision that if it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary, or other officer of the company, such person shall also be deemed to be guilty.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 141 in various judgments. The court has consistently held that mere designation as a director is not sufficient to attract liability. There must be specific allegations in the complaint showing that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. The court has also drawn a distinction between executive and non-executive directors, holding that non-executive directors who are not involved in day-to-day operations cannot be held liable without specific evidence of their involvement.
In the Ranganayakulu case, the Supreme Court noted that authorised signatories can be categorized as drawers under Section 138 when the conditions under Section 141 are fulfilled. This suggests that the court was looking at the overlap between these provisions. If a person is made exclusively responsible for financial dealings, they are not just any signatory. They are, in effect, the person in charge of that aspect of the organization's business, and therefore they can be treated as the drawer directly.
The Rejection of the Shri Gurudatta Sugars Precedent: A Nuanced Approach
One of the most interesting aspects of this judgment is how the Supreme Court handled the precedent from Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors. (2024). Mr. Ranganayakulu had relied heavily on this case to argue that as an authorised signatory, he could not be the drawer.
In the Shri Gurudatta Sugars case, the Supreme Court had held that an authorised signatory is not considered the "drawer" under Section 138 for the purpose of Section 143A, which deals with interim compensation. The court in that case had drawn a distinction between the legal entity and the individual acting as an authorised signatory. It had held that while authorised signatories can bind the company through their actions, they do not merge their legal status with that of the company.
The bench in Ranganayakulu's case carefully distinguished this precedent. They clarified that the Shri Gurudatta Sugars judgment did not lay down a blanket rule that no authorised signatory can ever be a drawer under Section 138. The ruling was specific to the context of Section 143A and interim compensation. It did not immunize all authorised signatories from personal liability in all circumstances.
The court emphasized that when the conditions under Section 141 are met, and when the signatory is the exclusive financial representative made responsible for all payments, that signatory can indeed be categorized as a drawer. This is a nuanced approach. The court is not saying that every authorised signatory is always the drawer. But it is saying that in cases where the signatory has been made the "front face" of the organization for a specific transaction, and where the responsibility is exclusively theirs, they cannot hide behind the authorized signatory label to escape liability.
This nuanced approach is important because it preserves the integrity of the earlier judgment while preventing its misuse. The court is essentially saying that the law must look at the substance of the transaction, not just the form. If the substance of the arrangement is that one person is solely responsible for drawing and issuing cheques, then that person is the drawer in substance, regardless of what label they carry.
The Sentence Modification: Justice with Mercy
While the Supreme Court was firm on the question of liability and conviction, it showed a degree of compassion when it came to sentencing. This is worth noting because it reveals the court's balanced approach.
Mr. Ranganayakulu was convicted by the trial court, and that conviction was upheld. The normal sentence under Section 138 can include imprisonment up to two years and a fine up to twice the cheque amount. Given that the cheque amount in such cases is often substantial, the potential sentence can be quite severe.
However, the Supreme Court took into account that Mr. Ranganayakulu was merely the Treasurer of the society. He was not the President, the Chairman, or the founder of the NGO. He was an office bearer who had been entrusted with financial responsibilities, but he was not the principal decision-maker of the organization. The court recognized that there was a difference in culpability between a person who is the driving force behind an organization and a person who serves in a subordinate capacity, even if both may be liable under the law.
The court modified the sentence to a fine of ₹1.5 crore, to be paid to TSSPDCL within two months. In case of default, he would have to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. This is still a very substantial penalty. ₹1.5 crore is a large sum, and the threat of one year in prison is serious. But it is less severe than the maximum possible sentence, and it gives the appellant an opportunity to avoid imprisonment by making the payment.
This modification sends a message that while the law will hold signatories accountable, the courts will also consider the individual's role and circumstances when determining the appropriate punishment. It is a reminder that justice is not just about conviction; it is also about proportionality in sentencing.
Practical Lessons: What You Should Do If You Sign Cheques for an Organization
This judgment is not just a legal precedent. It is a practical guide for anyone who serves as an office bearer, treasurer, secretary, or authorised signatory for any organization in India. Whether you run a small NGO, a large trust, a society, or a company, here are the key takeaways from this ruling.
- Know your role: If you are made the authorised signatory for your organization, understand exactly what that means. If you are specifically made responsible for signing cheques, making payments, and handling financial transactions with a particular party, you are not just a rubber stamp. You are the "front face" of the organization for those transactions, and you can be held liable if things go wrong.
- Read the MoU or agreement: Before you sign any cheque under a formal agreement, read the agreement carefully. If the agreement specifically casts responsibility on you and does not make any other office bearer liable, you are in a high-risk position. You need to be doubly sure that the organization has the funds to honour the cheque and that the transaction is legitimate.
- Do not assume immunity: Do not assume that because you are signing on behalf of an organization, you are immune from personal liability. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the authorized signatory label does not give you a free pass. If you are the front face, you are responsible for the consequences.
- Ensure financial discipline: If you are a signatory, insist on robust financial governance in your organization. Make sure there are clear procedures for cheque issuance, dual controls where possible, and regular monitoring of bank balances. Do not sign cheques blindly based on instructions from others. Verify that the funds are available.
- Consider resigning if necessary: If you find yourself in a position where you are being made the sole signatory for transactions that you do not fully control or understand, and if the organization's financial health is questionable, consider whether it is worth continuing in that role. Resigning from a position of responsibility before a cheque is dishonoured may not automatically absolve you of liability for cheques already signed, but it can protect you from future exposure.
- Seek legal advice: If you are already facing a cheque bounce notice or complaint, do not rely on generic arguments about being an authorised signatory. The law is now clear that such arguments will not work in cases where you have been made the front face. You need specific legal advice tailored to the facts of your case, the terms of your authorization, and the nature of your role in the organization.
The Larger Context: Strengthening the Integrity of Cheques in India
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is one of the oldest commercial laws in India, but it remains incredibly relevant today. In an era of digital payments, UPI, and internet banking, one might think that cheques are becoming obsolete. But the reality is that cheques continue to play a vital role in India's commercial and institutional life, especially for large transactions, government payments, and dealings between organizations.
The Supreme Court's judgment in the Ranganayakulu case is part of a broader judicial effort to strengthen the integrity of cheques as a payment instrument. The law on cheque bounces has evolved significantly over the past few decades. What was once treated primarily as a civil matter is now a criminal offence with serious consequences. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the purpose of Section 138 is to ensure that cheques are not issued lightly and that those who issue them honour their commitments.
This judgment extends that philosophy to the NGO and social sector. It recognizes that organizations, whether for-profit or non-profit, cannot use their structure to evade responsibility for dishonoured cheques. If an organization appoints a signatory and makes that person the front face of its financial dealings, the law will hold that person accountable. This is not just about punishing individuals. It is about creating a culture of financial responsibility and ensuring that cheques remain a credible and trustworthy instrument of payment.
The judgment also aligns with the broader principles of corporate governance and accountability. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on transparency and accountability in the NGO sector, particularly concerning foreign funding and government grants. This ruling adds another dimension to that accountability by ensuring that those who handle the money are answerable for how it is handled.
Conclusion: A Judgment That Demands Attention
The Supreme Court's ruling in K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana & Ors. is a landmark judgment that clarifies and expands the scope of liability under Section 138 of the NI Act. By holding that an authorised signatory who is made the "front face" of an organization can be deemed the drawer of a cheque, the court has closed a potential loophole and sent a strong message about financial accountability.
For the millions of people who serve as office bearers in India's vast NGO sector, this judgment is a serious wake-up call. The days of assuming that signing a cheque on behalf of an organization is a risk-free act are over. If you are the authorised signatory, if you are specifically made responsible for financial transactions, and if you are the front face of your organization in a deal, you can be held personally liable if the cheque bounces.
At the same time, the judgment is not a blanket condemnation of all signatories. The court's nuanced approach, distinguishing between different roles and contexts, ensures that liability is tied to actual responsibility, not mere designation. The modification of the sentence also shows that the court recognizes the difference between a principal wrongdoer and a person who may have been caught up in the organization's financial difficulties.
This judgment will be cited in courts across India for years to come. It will shape how complaints are drafted, how defenses are argued, and how organizations structure their financial responsibilities. Most importantly, it will make every authorised signatory think twice before putting pen to paper. And that, ultimately, is what the law on cheque bounces is meant to do. It is meant to make people take their financial commitments seriously, to ensure that a cheque is not just a piece of paper but a solemn promise to pay.
In the end, this case is about trust. The power distribution company trusted the NGO, and the NGO, through its Treasurer, issued cheques as a token of that trust. When the cheques bounced, the trust was broken. The Supreme Court has now ruled that the person who broke that trust by issuing the dishonoured cheque cannot walk away simply by saying they were acting on behalf of someone else. If you are the front face, you are responsible. It is a simple message, but it is one that needed to be said loud and clear.
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