Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) is a landmark decision in the constitutional history of India. It was among the first major challenges to how far Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution could go—especially whether Parliament could amend fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. As India entered its early post-Independence years, the government sought to introduce social and economic reforms, including land reforms and redistribution, which sometimes clashed with property rights and other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The First Amendment Act of 1951 introduced changes that upset many landowners and commentators. The Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad was asked to decide whether those changes were valid or whether they violated constitutional limits.
The court’s ruling affirmed a broad view of Parliament’s power, holding that Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution—including fundamental rights. That view shaped constitutional debates for decades, until later cases refined, restricted, or even reversed parts of its doctrine. In short, Shankari Prasad is the starting point for the ongoing tension in Indian law between constitutional flexibility and the protection of basic rights.
Historical Background: Context of the First Amendment and Land Reforms
To appreciate why Shankari Prasad became such an important case, we must look at the historical backdrop. After India gained independence in 1947 and adopted its Constitution in 1950, it aimed to build a society based on social justice, equality, and economic fairness. Land reforms became a central policy tool. Many areas were under the Zamindari system, a colonial-era landlord system where large landowners (zamindars) held vast tracts of land and collected rent from peasants. This system was widely criticized for concentrating land, fostering exploitation, and perpetuating inequality.
State governments passed laws to abolish or restrict zamindari rights, and to redistribute land to cultivators or small farmers. But many of these laws were challenged in courts by zamindars who said their rights under the Constitution were being violated. Specifically, they invoked the then-fundamental rights such as the right to property (under Article 31) and other protections in Part III, claiming that state laws on land acquisition or abolition unlawfully abridged those rights.
Facing these legal challenges, the Union government decided to amend the Constitution to strengthen its ability to carry out land reforms without being struck down by courts. The First Amendment Act, 1951 was enacted to insert provisions (Articles 31A and 31B) and create a Ninth Schedule, which shielded certain laws (especially land reform laws) from judicial review on the grounds of violating fundamental rights. It also introduced changes restricting free speech in certain contexts, and enabling the State to make special provisions for socially backward classes.
When the First Amendment came into effect, some zamindars promptly challenged it. They argued that Parliament could not use constitutional amendment to override or curtail fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Their challenge came to the Supreme Court as Shankari Prasad, and that case became the test of whether such constitutional amendments would be upheld or struck down as unconstitutional.
Facts and Claimants in the Case
In Shankari Prasad, the petitioners were landowners (zamindars), notably Shankari Prasad Singh Deo among others. They had pending litigation in various High Courts challenging the validity of state land reform laws (abolition or acquisition of estates) on the ground that they violated fundamental rights (especially right to property). While those cases were pending, the Parliament passed the First Amendment to the Constitution in 1951, which inserted Articles 31A and 31B, created the Ninth Schedule, and added other provisions.
The petitioners then brought petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution (the right to move Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights) to challenge the constitutional validity of that Amendment itself. Essentially, they sought to say that Parliament’s power to amend did not include power to take away or abridge fundamental rights, and hence the First Amendment was ultra vires (beyond Parliament’s power) to that extent.
Multiple petitions were consolidated. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the Amendment was valid or whether it contravened limitations implied by the Constitution, particularly those in Article 13(2) (which states that no “law” shall abridge fundamental rights) and whether Article 368 (the amending power) itself allowed the alteration of fundamental rights.
Issues before the Supreme Court
The court had to resolve several important and interlinked issues. Key among them:
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Whether the power granted by Article 368 to amend the Constitution includes the power to amend or alter Fundamental Rights in Part III. In other words, is there any implicit limitation on Parliament’s ability to modify fundamental rights by constitutional amendment?
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Whether Article 13(2), which prohibits the State from making any “law” that takes away or abridges fundamental rights, applies to constitutional amendments made under Article 368. In other words, does a constitutional amendment count as a “law” under Article 13(2), thereby making it invalid if it abridges fundamental rights?
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Whether the provisional Parliament (functioning under Article 379 during the transitional period before the first general elections) had the authority to exercise amendment powers, including passing the First Amendment.
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Whether the Amendment Act’s provisions (Articles 31A and 31B, Ninth Schedule) required ratification by states under the proviso to Article 368 because they affected powers of Supreme Court or High Courts (Articles 132, 136, 226). Petitioners argued that those changes were more than mere amendment; they impinged courts’ jurisdiction and hence required state ratification.
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Whether during the passage of the constitutional amendment bill in Parliament, the bill could be amended or altered (i.e. whether Article 368 provides a “complete code” prohibiting amendments to amendment bills after they are introduced).
The Supreme Court’s answers to these questions would define the extent of constitutional amendments and the inviolability (or not) of fundamental rights in the Indian legal order.
Arguments of the Petitioners (Zamindars)
The petitioners challenged the First Amendment on multiple grounds. They argued first that Article 368 provided only the procedure for amending the Constitution, not the substantive power to amend all provisions, and especially not to amend fundamental rights. That is, Parliament cannot be taken to have unlimited power to override constitutional guarantees merely by following the amending procedure. They urged that certain fundamental rights were intended to be sacrosanct and immune from amendment.
In particular, they invoked Article 13(2), which says that the State shall not make any law that takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, and that any law in contravention shall be void. The petitioners contended that a constitutional amendment, even if passed under Article 368, is still a “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2), and hence any part of it that abridges fundamental rights must be void.
They also argued that Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule — by excluding certain land reform laws from judicial review under Part III — effectively curtailed the power of courts, including in Article 132, 136, and 226 jurisdictions. Since those changes affect High Courts’ and Supreme Court’s powers, they claimed that such amendments should have been ratified by states under the proviso to Article 368, but they were not, making parts of the First Amendment invalid.
The petitioners further claimed that the provisional Parliament did not have the authority under Article 379 to exercise constituent powers such as amendment, especially since those powers involve both Houses of Parliament cooperatively, whereas the provisional Parliament was functioning as a unicameral body. They also contended that the process of the amendment bill’s passing in Parliament had deviations and modifications and that Article 368 should be treated as a “complete code” forbidding amendments to an amendment once introduced.
Overall, their case aimed to draw constitutional boundaries around Parliament’s amending power and protect fundamental rights from unlimited erosion.
Arguments of the Respondents (Union of India / Government)
The government, defending the Amendment, advanced several counterarguments. Their core contention was that Article 368 is a comprehensive provision granting Parliament the power to amend all parts of the Constitution, including Part III. They argued that there is no express or implied limitation in Article 368 excluding fundamental rights from amendment, and to read such a limitation would defeat the flexibility the Constitution intended.
They distinguished between the Parliament’s function in its legislative capacity (making ordinary laws) and its function in constituent capacity (amending the Constitution). They contended that Article 13(2) applies only to laws made under ordinary legislative power, not constitutional amendments made under Article 368. The term “law” in Article 13(2) should be interpreted in a narrow sense: it refers to statutes and regulations under ordinary legislative power, not to constitutional amendments. If one were to treat constitutional amendments as “law” under Article 13(2), then the entire amending power of Parliament would become null in relation to fundamental rights, which would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Constitution.
Regarding the provisional Parliament, the government argued that Article 379 explicitly authorized the Constituent Assembly (transformed into provisional Parliament) to exercise all powers conferred on Parliament until the first elections. That includes amendment power under Article 368. To argue otherwise would sabotage the transitional arrangements of the Constitution.
On the claim of state ratification, the government maintained that Articles 31A and 31B do not impinge on judicial power—they merely remove certain matters from the purview of Part III, not strip courts of jurisdiction. Therefore, they did not require ratification by states.
On the procedural objections, the government contended that Article 368 is not a closed or rigid code; Parliamentary procedure, including rules of each House under Article 118, can apply in matters of amendment procedure. Further, that revising or making changes in the amendment bill during debate does not invalidate the process unless it violates the essential procedural requirements.
Overall, the government’s defense asserted that constitutional amendments should be free from the constraints that govern ordinary legislation, so as to allow the Constitution to evolve with changing needs.
Judgment of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the constitutional validity of the First Amendment Act, 1951, and rejected the challenge from the petitioners. The court’s judgment laid down key principles that would influence constitutional jurisprudence for years to come.
Power to Amend Fundamental Rights
The court held that the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 includes the power to amend fundamental rights. The language of Article 368 is comprehensive and does not contain any express exception that excludes fundamental rights from its scope. The court reasoned that if the framers had intended any part of the Constitution, like fundamental rights, to be unamendable, they would have said so. Since they did not, it must be presumed that the Constitution allows amendment of all its parts, including fundamental rights.
Interpretation of “Law” in Article 13(2)
One of the most important holdings of Shankari Prasad is the distinction drawn between “law” under Article 13(2) and constitutional amendments under Article 368. The court interpreted “law” in Article 13(2) to refer only to legislative statutes and regulations under ordinary legislative powers, not constitutional amendments made under Article 368 (which is a constituent power). The court said that if constitutional amendments were included in the meaning of “law” under Article 13(2), then Article 368 would be rendered meaningless or impotent when applied to fundamental rights. Therefore, amendments under Article 368 are not subject to the limitations in Article 13(2).
Provisional Parliament’s Authority
The court upheld that the provisional Parliament, functioning under Article 379, had the power to carry out amendments under Article 368. The Constitution expressly allowed the provisional Parliament to exercise all powers conferred by the Constitution on Parliament until the first general elections. To deny it the power to amend would defeat the transitional design of the Constitution.
Ratification and Judicial Powers
Regarding the question whether Articles 31A and 31B needed ratification by states, the court held that those provisions did not in fact alter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or High Courts. They only excluded certain matters from being challenged under Part III and did not curtail the courts’ powers per se. Thus, state ratification under Article 368’s proviso was not needed.
Procedural Flexibility
The court also rejected the argument that Article 368 is a closed code prohibiting changes to amendment bills mid-process. It said that procedural rules made by Parliament or rules of Houses (under Article 118) could apply to amendment bills unless they conflict with the essential requirements of Article 368 itself. The court recognized that the Constitution did not lay out every procedural detail, leaving gaps for rules of Parliament to fill.
Legal Principles Established
From its reasoning, several principles emerged:
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Parliament has the constituent power under Article 368 to amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.
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The term “law” in Article 13(2) does not cover constitutional amendments made under Article 368.
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Constitutional amendments are not subject to invalidation for abridging fundamental rights if they meet the amending procedure.
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The provisional Parliament had power to amend under Article 368.
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Amendment bills may be altered during passage, so long as the core procedure is respected.
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Courts cannot strike down constitutional amendments merely because they conflict with Part III.
In upholding Shankari Prasad, the Supreme Court set the foundation for the idea that, subject to procedure, the Constitution and its deepest protections were amenable to change by Parliament.
Impacts, Criticisms, and Later Developments
While Shankari Prasad was authoritative for several years, it did not remain unchallenged indefinitely. Over time, judicial interpretation evolved, especially as courts grappled with preserving fundamental rights and constraining abusive power. The Shankari Prasad doctrine came under pressure and was modified or reversed by later landmark cases. Some of the important developments are as follows.
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1964)
In this case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Shankari Prasad’s view that Parliament can amend fundamental rights. However, some judges expressed doubts about the complete lack of limitation on amendment power. Still, the decision gave further support to the constitutionality of landmark amendments and the Ninth Schedule.
I. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)
This case marked a turning point. In Golaknath, a majority of the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights, holding that Part III rights have a transcendental status beyond amendment. The court said that any attempt to take away or abridge fundamental rights would be void even if made under Article 368. The decision effectively reversed Shankari Prasad’s doctrine in that respect. The court also held that constitutional amendments are “law” as per Article 13(2). However, Golaknath was itself later modified by subsequent jurisprudence.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
In this watershed decision, the Supreme Court struck a balance. It overruled Golaknath (in part) and reasserted that Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights, but subject to an overriding restriction: Parliament cannot alter the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Under this doctrine, fundamental features—such as constitutional supremacy, judicial review, separation of powers, federalism, and essential freedoms—cannot be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment. Thus, while Shankari Prasad’s view of unconstrained amending power was curtailed, the idea that constitutional amendments are not mere ordinary laws remained in some measure.
44th Amendment and Right to Property
Another important development relates to the Right to Property. Originally a fundamental right under Article 31, property rights and their limitations were central to land reform controversies. Later, through the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the government removed the Right to Property from the list of fundamental rights and made it a legal right under Article 300A. This change reduced the constitutional tension around property rights and made some of the issues in Shankari Prasad less pressing in later years.
Further Cases: Minerva Mills, Kihota Hollohan, I.R. Coelho
After Kesavananda, subsequent decisions further refined and enforced the basic structure doctrine. In Minerva Mills, parts of the 42nd Amendment were struck down as violating basic structure. In Kihota Hollohan, the Ninth Schedule was held to be subject to judicial review if the legislation inserted there violated basic structure. In I.R. Coelho, the court held that even laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 1973 would be subject to challenge if they contravene basic structure. These developments mean that the protective shield once cast by Shankari Prasad has gradually been constrained by judicial review in light of constitutional values.
Criticisms of Shankari Prasad
Critics of the Shankari Prasad doctrine have argued that it gives Parliament unchecked power to amend away the core rights of citizens. They say that the court’s distinction between “law” under Article 13(2) and constitutional amendments is artificial and undermines the sanctity of fundamental rights. Some have also criticized that it fails to offer real protection to individual liberties and allows majoritarian majorities to alter the Constitution at will. The later evolution of doctrine through Golaknath and Kesavananda suggests that many of these criticisms held weight, leading to a more balanced jurisprudence that corrects Shankari Prasad’s excesses.
The Legacy and Continuing Relevance
Despite its limitations, Shankari Prasad remains historically and doctrinally significant. It established foundational ideas about the nature of constitutional amendment. Even though its pure doctrine that fundamental rights are fully amendable has been moderated, its logic that amendment power is different from ordinary legislative power continues to influence constitutional reasoning.
In modern times, Shankari Prasad is often cited as a starting point in the trajectory of constitutional amendment jurisprudence. It teaches that a constitution must allow change, that Parliament must have flexibility to adapt, and that the procedure and structure matter deeply. At the same time, its shortcomings remind us why the concept of basic structure, judicial oversight, and constitutional safeguards are necessary to preserve the core of democracy and rights.
The debate sparked in Shankari Prasad—about amendment limits, the meaning of “law,” the nature of fundamental rights, and the tension between stability and change—continues in modern constitutional law in India. Students of law, constitutional scholars, and judges refer back to it to trace the shifting boundaries of power in the Indian constitution.
Understanding in Simple Terms: What Shankari Prasad Meant for India
To put Shankari Prasad in simpler words: Imagine the Constitution as a house, and fundamental rights as its important internal walls. Shankari Prasad said: “Yes, we can renovate or remove even internal walls, as long as we follow the process of renovation (i.e. amendment procedure).” That was a bold view. Later cases said: “Hold on — you can renovate, but you cannot destroy the foundation or the essential shape of the house.” Shankari Prasad gave Parliament wide power initially; subsequent cases inserted checks so that fundamental rights and constitutional core do not vanish with a majority.
Shankari Prasad’s doctrine gave the government room to implement land reforms and other social changes, which were important in early India. But the doctrine also raised the question: if Parliament can alter any right, where does protection lie for citizens? Later jurisprudence has answered that by placing limitations and oversight (basic structure, judicial review).
So, Shankari Prasad is not an absolute good or bad judgment—it is part of an evolving constitutional conversation. It represents the tension between giving elected representatives room to govern and ensuring essential rights do not become fragile or eroded.
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