Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965)
The case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan is a landmark decision in the constitutional history of India. It dealt with a fundamental question: Can Parliament amend any part of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III? In the 1960s, India was undergoing social and economic reforms, especially in the area of land redistribution.
The government sought to shield certain reform laws from judicial scrutiny by placing them in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and by passing amendments that altered the scope of property rights. Against this backdrop, Sajjan Singh, a former ruler and landowner, challenged the constitutionality of the 17th Amendment, arguing that it violated his fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case not only upheld Parliament’s power but also triggered deep debates about the limits of constitutional amendment, judicial review, and the sanctity of fundamental rights. Importantly, among the dissenting judgments and later developments, seeds were sown for what later became the doctrine of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Understanding this case is vital for appreciating how Indian constitutional law evolved, how tensions between parliamentary supremacy and judicial protection of rights were negotiated, and how later landmark judgments like I.C. Golaknath and Kesavananda Bharati were shaped by this decision.
Historical and Constitutional Background
In post-independence India, land reform was a central policy objective to reduce inequality and break the dominance of feudal landholding systems. Many states enacted laws to limit ownership, impose ceilings, or redistribute surplus land. But such laws often faced challenges in courts as infringing on property rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Earlier cases had already touched on the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution.
In Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951), the Supreme Court upheld that Parliament’s power to amend under Article 368 includes power to amend Part III, including fundamental rights. Later, A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras questioned the scope of fundamental rights but did not disturb the view that amendments could include altering fundamental rights. Thus by the 1960s, judicial precedents gave Parliament wide leeway in enacting amendments, and questions about the extent of judicial review and protection of rights were gaining urgency.
It was in this context that the 17th Amendment, seeking to expand the Ninth Schedule and adjust definitions like “estate,” was introduced. The challenge in Sajjan Singh’s case became a test of whether constitutional amendments could override or bypass judicial safeguards and whether the term “law” in Article 13 would include constitutional amendments, thus making them subject to the limitations imposed on ordinary laws.
Facts of the Case and Parties
The various petitions in Sajjan Singh’s case arose after Parliament passed the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of India. The Amendment expanded the definition of “estate” under Article 31A and included certain laws (notably land reform laws) into the Ninth Schedule, thereby insulating them from challenges on the ground that they violated fundamental rights. Sajjan Singh, who was formerly ruler of the princely state of Ratlam, contended that these changes adversely affected his property rights and privileges that had been guaranteed under earlier agreements.
He argued that the Amendment, by excluding laws from judicial review and expanding governmental power to acquire land, took away his rights under Part III. A number of other landowners joined with similar complaints under writ petitions in the Supreme Court under Article 32.
They contended that the 17th Amendment was unconstitutional because it abridged or took away guaranteed rights, and that Parliament had exceeded its constitutional power. The State of Rajasthan and the Union of India defended the amendment as a legitimate use of parliamentary constituent power under Article 368 and as necessary for enabling agrarian reforms for public welfare.
Issues Before the Court
The Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh framed several deep constitutional questions. The principal issue was whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 extends to all provisions, including fundamental rights under Part III, and whether such amendments are immune from challenge in courts.
The Court also had to decide if an amendment can be a “law” under Article 13(2), which prohibits the State from making any law that takes away or abridges rights in Part III. In effect, if an amendment is a “law,” then Article 13(2) would render it void if it infringes fundamental rights.
Another related question was whether placing laws in the Ninth Schedule shields them completely from judicial review. Also, whether there are any constitutional limitations or inherent restrictions on Parliament’s amending power beyond procedural requirements. Finally, underlying all this was the balance between judicial review (the power of courts to check legislative action) and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in constitutional amendments.
Arguments of the Petitioner
Sajjan Singh and the other petitioners advanced strong arguments. They contended that the 17th Amendment altered fundamental rights, especially property rights, and thus fell foul of Article 13(2), which disallows laws that take away or abridge rights in Part III. In their view, constitutional amendments cannot be immune from judicial examination; otherwise, Parliament could override rights at will.
They argued that Article 368 is not absolute; it prescribes a procedure but does not supply unlimited substance to amend even basic rights. Moreover, they emphasized that placing laws in the Ninth Schedule should not make them beyond judicial scrutiny if they violate basic constitutional norms.
They urged the Court to reconsider or overturn earlier precedents like Shankari Prasad, and to hold that some rights (particularly property or other core rights) deserve protection from parliamentary encroachment. They also raised that privileges granted to former rulers (e.g. privy purses) should not be abrogated without compensating or preserving rights because of constitutional guarantees.
Arguments of the Respondents and Government
The State of Rajasthan and the Union defended the amendment on several grounds. They asserted that Article 368 confers a constituent power on Parliament to amend the Constitution, and this power necessarily includes power to amend any part, including Part III.
They argued that “law” in Article 13(2) refers only to ordinary laws made by the legislature and not to constitutional amendments under Article 368, thus amendments are outside the scope of Article 13’s prohibition. The respondents emphasized the necessity of reform for social justice, including land redistribution, and contended that protecting these laws from judicial challenges was necessary to ensure stability and social welfare.
They asserted that Ninth Schedule protection is constitutionally valid. The respondents also urged the Court to adhere to existing precedent (like Shankari Prasad) and to avoid overruling earlier decisions, maintaining that uniformity and certainty in constitutional interpretation are important. The government insisted that no inherent limitation should be read in Article 368, except its procedural requirements and state ratification when required.
Judgment of the Court – Majority Opinion
On 30 October 1964, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered its verdict by a majority of 3:2, with Chief Justice Gajendragadkar writing the main judgment. The majority upheld the constitutional validity of the 17th Amendment. The Court held that Parliament’s power under Article 368 is plenary — meaning that it extends to all parts of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.
Therefore, an amendment is not “law” in the sense of Article 13(2), so Article 13 cannot be used to challenge amendments that take away or abridge fundamental rights. The majority reasoned that the term “law” in Article 13 must be confined to ordinary legislative enactments, not constitutional amendments arising from constituent power.
They said that if every amendment were subject to Article 13, then the very guarantees of constitution-making would become bogged in judicial checks. They also emphasized that earlier precedents (Shankari Prasad, etc.) must be respected, and this continuity is necessary for legal stability. The majority further observed that placing laws into the Ninth Schedule is consistent with constitutional scheme and does not per se offend judicial review, because Parliament is exercising its proper amendment function.
Dissenting Opinions and Seeds of Basic Structure
Two dissenting judges—Justice Mudholkar and Justice Hidayatullah—differed from the majority and voiced serious reservations about unlimited amendment power. Justice Mudholkar expressed “doubts” whether Parliament’s amending power should encompass alteration of the fundamental framework or basic features of the Constitution.
Although he agreed to dismiss the challenge in that case, he suggested that there might be aspects which should remain beyond the reach of the amending process. This cautious suggestion is one of the earliest inklings of what later evolved into the doctrine of basic structure. Justice Hidayatullah argued more forcefully that fundamental rights remain integral to the Constitution’s identity and cannot be wholly submerged by amendment.
He saw rights as more than just legal provisions; they form the core of the Constitution’s promise to citizens. He asserted that judicial review must remain a protector against abuses of constituent power. The dissenting views, though in minority, planted conceptual seeds. In later years, they were cited and expanded, especially in I.C. Golaknath and in Kesavananda Bharati judgment, where the basic structure doctrine became central.
Ratio and Principles Established
From the majority judgment in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, some key legal principles (ratio) emerged. First, Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 is comprehensive and includes all parts of the Constitution, including Part III. Second, constitutional amendments made under Article 368 are not “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2), so they cannot be invalidated on the ground that they take away or abridge fundamental rights.
Third, placing laws within the Ninth Schedule is a valid constitutional device to protect laws from judicial challenge when used via proper amendment procedure. Fourth, consistency with precedent is an important principle to maintain legal continuity, so the Court declined to disturb earlier judgments. The majority essentially drew a distinction between constitutional lawmaking (amendment) and ordinary legislation, insulating amendment from the constraints applicable to ordinary laws.
Aftermath and Subsequent Developments
Although Sajjan Singh affirmed Parliament’s wide amending power, its authority was not final in India’s constitutional trajectory. In I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), the Supreme Court reversed the view that Parliament can amend fundamental rights freely. A majority in Golaknath held that amendments are “law” under Article 13, and thus any amendment that abridges or takes away fundamental rights is void.
Then, in the famous Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) decision, the Supreme Court struck a middle path: Parliament can amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights, but it cannot alter its “basic structure”. This doctrine essentially overruled the unlimited view in Sajjan Singh and placed an intrinsic limitation on amendment power.
In that sense, Sajjan Singh is historically important, as its dissenting views (especially Justice Mudholkar’s suggestion of basic features) influenced later evolution of constitutional law. Over time, in modern jurisprudence, the Sajjan Singh majority view is not seen as correct on fundamental rights, but its holding still remains part of India’s constitutional history and foundation from which later doctrine was built.
Significance and Legacy
The significance of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan lies not in affirming the final view, but in how the case shaped the evolution of India’s constitutional structure. First, it reaffirmed that Parliament had wide power to amend, which gave the state authority to push through legal and social reforms. Second, by treating constitutional amendments as not subject to Article 13, the judgment clarified the special status of the amendment process.
Third, the dissenting views proved remarkably prescient: the seeds of the basic structure doctrine were sown here. Many future judgments would draw from Mudholkar’s caution about unrestrained amendment, and from Hidayatullah’s emphasis on judicial safeguards. In constitutional teaching, Sajjan Singh is seen as a precursor—a necessary step in the gradual shift from parliamentary supremacy to a balance with judicial review and constitutional identity.
Even though its majority rule is overruled in substance by later judgments, it retains value as an early watershed in the India’s legal thought: it highlights the tension between democracy and rights, between flexibility and limitation, and the evolving role of courts vs Parliament in protecting the Constitution’s deeper promises.
Critical Assessment and Criticism
Sajjan Singh has been criticized by scholars and jurists for overreaching in its majority view. Many argue that the majority’s narrow reading of “law” in Article 13 was artificial, and that constitutional amendments should not automatically be immune from review. Critics say that the decision gives Parliament virtual unchecked power, subject only to procedural safeguards, which undermines the idea that fundamental rights are supreme and inviolable.
The majority’s insistence on preserving precedent came at the cost of deeper constitutional reflection, some argue, because it preserved unsettled interpretations at the expense of evolving justice. Moreover, critics point out that the majority failed to sufficiently engage with the idea that the Constitution is more than a legal document—it embodies values, ideals, and constraints that should not be easily overridden. The dissenters were more attuned to that constitutional dignity.
In hindsight, Sajjan Singh is often seen as bold but flawed: bold in affirming parliamentary power, but flawed in not recognizing inherent safeguards. Overturning parts of it in later cases was necessary for creating a more balanced constitutional framework.
Lessons from Sajjan Singh for Constitutional Law
From the Sajjan Singh judgment and its aftermath, several lessons emerge for students and practitioners of constitutional law. First, the nature of constituent power (the power to amend the Constitution) must be distinguished from legislative power; treating amendment as ordinary lawmaking creates tension with constitutional supremacy. Second, judicial review and constitutional identity cannot always yield to democratic majorities; courts must sometimes protect deep constitutional values.
Third, dissenting opinions—even if minority—can be seeds of future transformation; in this case, dissent paved the way for basic structure doctrine. Fourth, precedent must be respected, but it should not freeze constitutional evolution at a flawed point. Finally, the case shows that constitutional theory and social policy interact: reforms (like land reform) often require constitutional tactics, but those must still respect the rule of law and constitutional substance.
Contemporary Relevance of Sajjan Singh
Even today, the debate between amendment flexibility and constitutional limits is live in India. Issues like curtailing judicial powers, restructuring institutions, or constitutional amendments on rights continue to evoke arguments about whether Parliament can go beyond a certain threshold. The basic structure doctrine, which owes part of its origin to the dissent in Sajjan Singh, is central in modern jurisprudence.
Judges often reference that case when discussing the historic arc of limiting unchecked amendments. Also, when courts examine whether recent amendments violate constitutional identity or core values (such as democracy, separation of powers, equality, fundamental rights), the legacy of Sajjan Singh is felt indirectly. In teaching, Sajjan Singh remains part of the triad of early amendment jurisprudence (with Shankari Prasad, Golaknath) that every constitutional student must understand to grasp how India’s constitutional architecture matured.
Conclusion
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan stands as a pivotal moment in India’s constitutional journey. It affirmed Parliament’s expansive power to amend the Constitution—even fundamental rights—while also revealing the tensions inherent in doing so. Its majority view has since been curtailed by later evolutions in law, most notably through Golaknath and Kesavananda Bharati, which introduced limitations and the doctrine of basic structure. Yet, even those later developments cannot be fully understood without acknowledging how Sajjan Singh set the terms of constitutional contestation.
The case reminds us that a living constitution balances change and continuity, freedom and fairness, democracy and rights. Sajjan Singh’s legacy is therefore not simply its holding, but the dialogue it initiated—a dialogue between power and limitation, between Parliament and judiciary, and between the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
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